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MENTAL DISTRESS AS AN INDEPENDENT
BASIS FOR RECOVERY*
DONALD JAMES FARAGE"
The principal recognition accorded by the common law to the interest in
freedom from mental and emotional distress has been in regarding it universally
as a basis for the recovery of parasitic damages. In many jurisdictions, un-
intentional conduct which is recognizably likely to cause nothing more than
such a disturbance is not actionable even though it later results in physical
harm.1 In these states, recovery for such material harm is allowed if, but only
if, the actor should have realized not only that his conduct was likely to cause
distress, but also that the other was so lacking in ordinary physical resistance
to emotional strain that the disturbance involved an appreciable risk of harm-
ful consequences.
The fact that mental distress is intentionally inflicted may dispense with
the necessity of showing that the actor knew or should have known that the
other's subnormal power of resistance thereto gave the actor's misconduct a
potency to cause serious bodily harm which would otherwise be unlikely.2
Obviously, when one intentionally causes a mental disturbance, he has more
opportunity to reflect upon and to calculate the possible effect of his conduct
than in cases of negligent conduct where the actor should, but may not, vis-
ualize that he is subjecting another to a mental condition which may in turn
result in physical injury. Therefore, an intentional infliction of mental dis-
tress may entail broader liability than a negligent one, insofar as in the former
case, the actor in effect takes the risk that the other belongs to a subnormal
*This article does not deal with slander and libel or other actions for loss of reputation,
even though the damages are obviously based upon the offensive and thus distressing
character of the imputations.
**A.B., 1930; L.L.B. 1933. University of Pennsylvania; Admitted to Practice in Penn-
sylvania, 1933; Assistant to Francis H. Bohlen. Repoiter on *Torts, Restatement, for Ameri-
can Law Institute, 1933-; Professor of Law, Dickinson School of- Law, 1934-.
iMitchell v. Rochester Ry., 1i N. Y. 107 (1896).
tW s v. Downton. 2 Q. B. 57 (1897).
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class, whereas in the latter, it may be necessary to recovery that the actor should
have realized the other's subnormality.
However, apart from cases involving material harm, and unsupported
by some independent cause of action to which it may be parasitic, the in-
terest in freedom from emotional disturbance has been given by the common
law, a very limited and indeed peculiar protection even as against intentional
invasions. 8 Only two cases4 appear definitely to allow recovery and these
reveal not only an intention by the defendant to cause mental distress, but a
persistent course of conduct aimed to aggravate the effect.
Nevertheless, there are a number of highly specialized situations which
within their limited sphere, do seem to recognize mere mental distress as a
basis for recovery of damages. These situations appear with sufficient re-
currence as to merit separate consideration. To these various situations, we
now turn our attention.
DUTY OF CARRIERS TO PROTECT PASSENGERS FROM EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCES
Foremost among the cases appearing to protect the interest in freedom
from mental distress are the actions brought by passengers against carriers.
The cases fall principally into two groups; first, those in which mental dis-
tress or humiliation is alleged to have been intentionally inflicted by servants
of the carrier; second, those in which passengers sue a carrier for the failure of
its servants to protect them from mental distress caused by fellow-passengers.
A substantial number of jurisdictions have allowed recovery in these
sit is true that conduct causing the mere apprehension of a harmful or offensive
contact has always been held actionable and that such an apprehension does in a broad senie
constitute a mental disturbance. But the actor's liability for an "assault" is predicated upon the
other's mere realization of the intentionally threatened contact; and recovery is allowed quite
irrespectively of whether such realization results in fear or mental distress, or whether, on the
other hand, such realization fails altogether to alarm the other, as where his superior strength
makes him confident of his ability to avoid the threatened contact. Thus liability for an "assault"
is not essentially for mental "suffering", "anguish" or "distress" and is perhaps more properly
associated with that part of the law of torts dealing with liability for unprivileged bodily
contacts.41n Nickerson v. Hodges, 146 La. 735, (1920), plaintiff suffered humiliation as the result
of a "practical joke" perpetrated by defendants who led ptaintiff to search for, find and
deposit in a bank, a "pot of gold" which they had previously filled with dirt and stones, which
they "planted" for her to find. Defendants induced plaintiff to refrain from examining the con-
tents of the pot until a formal gathering of notables had been arranged before whom she finally
discovered, to her chagrin, that the whole affair had been a deliberated hoax. The other case
allowing recovery was Barnett v. Collection Service Co., 242 N.W. 25 (Iowa 1932), where
defendants in attempting to collect a small debt owed by plaintiff, persisted in writing a
stream of annoying and insulting letters, making numerous threats to vex plaintiff by lawsuits,
to cause beg discharge by her employer and geerally to "tie her up tighter than a drum." See
ao the dictum in Gadbury v. Bleits, 133 Wash. 134 (1925), that recovery would be allowed
is a o i9fm tional miscoaduct.
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cases for mere humiliation to which servants of carriers have subjected pas-
sengers. In most of these cases, the insulting treatment occurred in the course
of an altercation over the payment of fare, the passenger generally being openly
accused of dishonesty and of attempting to "steal rides" by nonpayment or
by tender of alleged counterfeit money or irregular tickets. 5 In many southern
states, recovery has been allowed for mental distress resulting from open
charges by the servant of the carrier that the passenger, although in fact of the
white race, was colored, and from the servant's insistence that the passenger
seat himself in the section reserved for negroes.6
In only one state has recovery been denied against a carrier for insult-
ing treatment of passengers by the carrier's servants, in the absence of physical
injury.7 On the other hand. even the courts allowing recovery attach various
limitations upon the carrier's liability. Thus, a number of states otherwise
imposing liability for abusive conduct of a servant, deny recovery if the ser-
vant was not acting in the "scope of his employment" at the time of the
offensive conduct.' So too, some cases deny recovery against the carrier where
the insulting remarks, though they concerned thc passenger and were over-
heard by him, were intended to be heard only by others.9 Occasionally but
5Lafitte v. N. Orleans City Ry Co., 43 La. Ann. 34 (1891); Gulf Ry. Co. v. Sullivan,.
119 So. 501 (Mo., 1928); Philips v. Aftl. Coast Line Ry., 160 S.C. 323 (1931); Bonner v.
Pullman Co., 160 S. C. 531 (1931); Texas Ry. v. Tarkington, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 353 (1931);
C.N.O. and T.P. Ry. v. Harris, 115 Tenn. 501 (1905); Gillespie v. Brooklyn H. y.
Co., 178 N.Y. 347 (1904); Ga. Ry and Elec. Co. v. Baker, 125 Ga. 474 (1897); McGinnis v.
Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 21 Mo. App. 399 (1886); Bleecker v. C. and L. Ry., "108 S.C. 151 ('1917);"
Austro-Amer. S.S. Co. v. Thomas, 248 Fed. 231 (N.Y. 1917); Yazoo Ry. Co. v.- Fitzgerald,
50 So. 631 (Miss. 1909) ; Ga.. S. and F. Ry. v. Ransom, 8 Ga. App. 277 (1910); Huffman v.
So. Ry. Co., 163 N.C. 171 (1913); So. Ry. Co. v. Carrole, 14 Ala. App. 374 (1915); Hum-
rhey v. Mich. United Ry., 166 Mich. 645 (1911); Cook v. Lusk, 186 Mo. App. 288 (1914);
Tudor v. Quebec Ry., 41 Quebec C. S. 19 (1911). See also Knoxville Traction Co. v. Lane,. 103
Tenn. 376 (1899) where a drunken motorman called plaintiff- a prostitute.
Set. Louis, Ark., and T. Ry. v. Mackie, 71 Tex. 4O1 (1888); May v. Shreveport Traction
Co., 126 La. 419 (1910); Wolfe v. Ga. Ry. and Elec. Co., 2 Ga. App. 499 (1907). In Haile
v. N. Orleans Ry. Co., 135 La. 229 (1914), plaintiff, a corpulent woman fell off her Seat in
a street car while it was going around a bend. She recovered for humiliation when
the conductor told her, as she was getting off the car, that "a fat woman like you haa no
business sitting in the front of the car".
7St. Louis, 1. M. and S. Ry. v. Taylor, 84 Ark. 42 (1907): Chicago, R: I. and P. Ry. v.
Moss, 89 Ark. 187 (1909); Dobbins v. Little Rock Ry., 79 Ark. 85 (1906) ; Little Rock Ry. v.
Putsche, 104 S. W. 554 (Ark. 1909), where the conductor mistook plaintiff for a negress and
ordered her to sit in the negro section.
SParker v. Erie Ry., 5 Hun. (N. Y.) 57 (1875); Southern Ry. v. Thurman, 121 KV. 716
(1906); Mo., K., and T. Ry. v. Pope, 149 S. W. 1185 (Tex. C. A. 1912). But apparently
contra, Knoxville Traction Co. v. Lane, supra note 5; Chesapeake Ry. v. Francisco, 149 Ky. 307
(1912); and Haile v. N. Orleans Ry. Co., supra note.6.
gGa. Ry. v. Baker, I Ga. App. 382 (1907); Louisville, N. R. Ry. v. Scott, 141 Ky. 538
(1911); Pitis., C. and S. L. Ry. v. Dervin. 86 111, 296 (1887). Compare Birmingh By. v.
Glean, 179 Ala. 163 .(1912).
DICKINON LAW IWTEW
not. always, recovery has been denied because, although the servant had ad-
mittedly accused the passenger of attempting to "steal" a ride or had called
him a negro, the servant had done so "in good faith" believing what he said
to be true, and had not done so "maliciously". 0 In addition, recovery has
been denied where the passenger's own conduct had "provoked" the abusive
treatment."'
The cases imposing liability upon carriers for mere mental distress suif-
fered by a passenger because of conduct of fellow- passengers are comparatively
few.12  On the other hand, there appears to be little contrary authority.'
3
The curious fact is that in no case is the plaintiff a male passenger. Indeed
there seems to be no reported case in which a male passenger brought such
an action. These cases in effect require the carrier to exercise, through its
,.cw, reasonable care to protect women from distress caused by conduct which
is offensive to what the courts regard as a reasonable sense of female modesty
and decency. In all of these cases, the fellow-passenger whom the crew fail-
ed. to restrain engaged in scurrilous, blasphemous and obscene language or
sang vulgar songs. The imposition of liability in these cases, most of which
are southern, reflect a highly chivalrous instinct on the part of the courts
which regard the interest in safeguarding feminine modesty and purity from
moral contamination as of sufficient social significarce to justify them in
ignoring the usual objections to recovery for mere mental distress. 14 .This
protection has been accorded to colored as well as white women.16
Even in Arkansas, which denies recovery for the abusive conduct of
servants of the carrier, recovery to female passengers for mental distress
resulting from boisterous, blasphemous language of drunken fellow-passengers
has been denied only because the conduct of such fellow-passengers was
1
0Southern Ry. v. Thurman, 121 Ky. 716 (1906); McGinnis v. Mo. Pac. Ry., 21
Mo. App. 399 (1886). Contra, May v. Shreveport Traction Co.; Wolfe v. Ga. Ry.. both
stpra note 6.
IlBurden v. Ga. Ry.. and Elec. Co., 13 Ga. App. 381 (1913); Pullman Palace Car
Co. v. Ehrman, 65 Miss. 383 (1888). But compare Mo., K., and T. Ry. v. Morgan 134'
S. W. 216 (Tex. C. A. 1911).
1ZSt. Louis, S. W. Ry. v. Wright, 84 S. W. 270 (Tex. C. A. 1904); Lucy v.. Chicago
etc. Ry., 64. Minn. 7 (1896); Louisville and N. Ry. v. Bell, 166 Ky. 400 (1915); Southern
Ry. v. Lee, 167 Ala. 268 (1910). Compare Texas P. Ry. v. Jones, 39 S. W. 124 (Tex.
C. A. 1897).
l3 Norris v. So. Ry., 84 S. C. 15 (19G9). See also Taylor v. Atlantic C. L. Ry., 59 S. E.
641 (S. C. 1909).
1
4 These cases present an analogy to those few cases in which courts have extended them-
sehes to find a physical contact necessary to support an action of trespass for battery where
men have by false pretences, induced women. to expose their persons to view. In such cases,
the battery is exceedingly technical and constitutes merely a "formula" by which female
decency is protected.
lULouisville *nd N. Ry. v, Bell; Southern Ry. v. Lee, supra aote 12.
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shown "not to have been directed at the plaintiff".16 On the other hand,
recovery appears properly to be limited to cases of conduct which is reason-
ably offensive to female decency and does not extend to cases of mere
"gruffness", "impatience", or "roughness of tone"." 7 Moreover, of course,
the carrier's duty is not absolute and is imposed only if its servants knew
or should have known of the plaintiff's predicament and, in the exercise
of reasonable care, could have restrained the misconduct of the fellow-passen-
gers.18
The pi otrction of the interest in freedom from mental distress has already
been characterized as peculiar. It is indeed cuious that a carrier should be
held vicariously liable for failing to prevent conduct of its servants or its
passengers which results in mental distress undet circumstances that would
not sustain recovery were the suit brought directly against the wrongdoer. 1'
Justification for these cases, if any, lies in the fact that the imposition of such
liability upon carriers is perhaps the most effective way in which the traveling
public may be assured not only safe. but decent transportation.
It is interesting to note that such liability has been imposed upon carriers,
not only for mental distress caused during the course of a journey, but also
for distress caused on the station premises, 20 and even though the plaintiff
had not yet procured a ticket and was not yet strictly a passenger. 2' This
fact negatives the suggestion that the basis of the carrier's duty is that the
passengers by going upon a train entrust their safety and comfort exclusively
to the carrier. If protection from mental distress is given by the law to
passengers while in stations, depots, and baggage rooms, there would seem
to be no logical reason why it should be restricted to carrier cases, and not
be extended to cases of all public utilities since the public is equally privileged
to be on the premises of any public utility for purposes connected with its
services. The extent of the liability imposed in other than carrier cases will
be considered below.
I6 Texarkana and S. F. Ry. v. Anderson, 67 Ark. 123 (1899).
l7Louisville and N. Ry. v. Ballird, 85 Ky. 307 (1887); Taylor v. Atlantic Ry.,
59 S.E. 641 (S.C. 1907).
1BHale v. Chesapeake and 0. Ry., 142 Ky. 835 (1911); Norris v. Southern Ry., 84
S. C. 15 (1909).
19 See the following cases not involving a carrier-passenger or other special relation and
denying recovery for mere mental anguish although intentionally inflicted. Brooker v. Silver-
thorne. III S. C. 553 (1919); Trawick v. Martin Brown Co., 79 Tex. 46o (1890); Barnes
v. Bickle, III Wash. 113 (1920); Alexander v. Pacholek, 222 Mich. 159 (1923); Texas
Power and Light Co., 201 S. W. 205 (Tex. 1918) and Reed v. Maley, 115 Ky. 816 (1903)..
Only the cases cited sxpra in note 4 appear contra.
Z0Gulf Ry. v. Luther, .90 S. W. 44 (Tex C. A. 1905); Richberger v. Amer. Express
Co., 73 Miss. 161 (1895).
2ITexas P. Ry. v. Jones, 39 S. W. 124 (Tex. C.A. 1897). But compare Huston.
and T. C. Ry. v. Phillio, 96 Tex. 18 (1902).
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One other group of cases in which carriers figure may be considered
in passing, namely, those in which a carrier is sued for mental anguish
alleged to have been caused because of negligent instead of intentional con-
duct. A large number of cases can be found in which a carrier is alleged
negligently to have caused mental distress to a passenger by delaying his
transportation, 22 or by carrying him beyond his destination. 23  So too, recovery
has been sought for mental anguish resulting from a carrier's negligent
delay in delivering a corpse thereby retarding funeral services and burial.
24
With few exceptions, 25 liability has been denied in all these cases, and this
in spite of the fact that a breach of contract is involved which might serve
as a basis for parasitic damages.
DUTY OF TELEGRAPH COMPANIES TO PREVENT EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS RESULTING FROM NEGLIGENT TRANSMISSION OF MESSAGES
In a number of southern and southwestern states, telegraph companies
have been held liable for emotional distress caused by -their negligence either
in delaying delivery of the message or in failing to transmit it accurately.
The great majority of cases involving delays in delivery concern messages
announcing the death or serious, illness of a relative of the sendee.2 6 In
22 Walsh v. Chicago etc. Ry., 42 Wis. 23 (1877); Zabon v. Cunard Steamship Co., 151
Iowa 345 (1911); Chicago, R. I. and P. Ry. v. Kyle, 182 Fed. 613 (Ark. 1910); Wilcox
v. Richmond and D. Ry., 52 Fed. 264 (S. C. 1892); Picklesimer v. Louisville and N.
Ry., 194 N. C. 40 (1927). Compare Ill. C. Ry. v. Head, 119 Ky., 809 (1905).
23 Trigg v.. St. Louis etc. Ry.. 74 Mo. 147 (1881); Deming v. Chicago, R. I. Ry.,
84 Mo. App. 152 (1899); Texarkana and Ft. Smith Ry. v. Anderson, 69 Ark. 123
(1899); Sappington v' Atlanta and W. P. Ry., 127 Ga. 178 (1906); Kans. etc. Ry.
v. Dalton, 65 Kans. 661 (1902); Pullman Co. v. Kelly, 86 Miss. 87 (1905); Smith v.
Wilmington and W. Ry., 130 N. C. 304 (1902); Black v. Charleston and W. Ry., 15
Wash. 213 (1896); Walsh v. Chicago etc. Ry., 42 Wis. 23 (1887); Muller v. B. and
0. Ry., 85 N. Y. 883 (1903).
ZdBeaulieu v. Gt, Northern Ry., 103 Minn. 47 (1907); So. Express Co. v. Byers,
240 U. S. 612 (1915); Compare Miles v. Amer. Express Co., i5O Ark. 114 (1921);
Gulf Ry. v. Beard. 129 Miss. 827 (1922).
2SNashville etc. Ry. v. Campbell, 212 Ala 27 (1924); I11. C. Ry. v. Hawkins, 114
Miss. 110 (1917); Burrus v. Nevada-Cal. Ry.. 38 Nev. 156 (1914). The last two cases
show evidence of wilfulness in delaying plaintiff's transportation. Denying recovery on
facts almost identical to those in Ill. C. Ry. v. Hawkins, is Central of Ga. Ry. v. Wal.
lace, 141 Ga. (1913). In Spaugh v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 155 S.E. 145 (S.C.
1930). plaintiff was allowed to recover for anxiety suffered for her children whom she
was not able to reach by the time expected by them because of wrong information as
to trains given her by a ticket agent. It appeared, however, that plaintiff had suffered
physically as well from exposure to weather.
2GRelle v. Western Union, 55 Tex. 308 (1881); Western Union v. Moore, 76 Tex.
66 (1890): Wadsworth v. Western Union, 86 Tenn. 695 (1888); Young v. Western
Union, 107 N. C. 370 (1891); Chapman v. Western Union, 90 Ky. 265 (1890);
Mentzer v. Western Union, 93 Iowa 752 (1895); Graham v. Western Union, 109. la.
j069 (1903); Western Union v. Stratemeier, 6 1nd. App, 125 (1892).
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consequence of the delay, the sendee was deprived of the opportunity of
reaching his relative's bedside before death or of attending the funeral. How-
ever, there are some cases allowing recovery for mental distress resulting
from delayed delivery which do not involve "death" messages. In one case,
plaintiff sent a message to a third person asking that the latter meet the
plaintiff at a "flag-station" and delay in delivery in the message resulted
in compelling plaintiff to walk a considerable distance alone at night.27  In
another case, mental distress was alleged to have resulted through the defend-
ant's failure promptly to deliver to the county clerk a telegram, wherein
plaintiff directed the clerk not to issue a marriage license to plaintiff's
eloping daughter. Because of the delay, the clerk had already issued the
license when the message arrived.28 So too, recovery has been allowed for
mental distress resulting from failure of a telegraph company promptly to
remit money sent by relatives to plaintiff in an emergency,29 or from fail-
ure promptly to deliver a message asking for medical aid.30
All the cases complaining of inaccuracies in transmission, rather than
delay in delivery, involve messages concerning the health of a relative. Thus
recovery has been allowed for transmitting the message, "Mary and baby
doing better", as "Mary and baby dieing". 3 In another case the message,
"Your sister better" was delivered as "Your sister dead",32
The majority of the states, especially in the north and east, in which
telegraph companies have been sued for mental anguish alone, have refused
to recognize the existence of any liability. 3   It is curious that the states
27Western Union v. Norton, 62 S. W. 1081 (Tex. C. A. 1901).
2
8 Western Union v. Proctor, 6 Tex. C. A. 300 (1894).
29Western Union v. Brooks, 221 S. W. 1024 (Tex. 1920).
BOWestern Union v. Cooper, 71 Tex. 507 (1888).
lLay v. Postal Teleg. Co., 171 Ala. 172 (1911).
22 Western Union v. Odom, 21 Tex. C. A. 537 (1899). Compare Taylor v.
Western Union, 31 Ky. L. R. 240 (1907); Gardner v. Cumberland Tel. and Western
Union Teleg. Co., 207 Ky. 249 (1925).
SSChapman v. Western Union, 88 Ga. 763 (1892); Connell v. Western Union, 116
Mo. 54 (1893); Western Union v. Chauteau, 28 Okla. 664 (1911); Ey v. Western
Union, 298 Fed. 357 (Cal. 1924); Russell v. Western Union, 3 Dak. 315 (1884);
Internat'l Teleg. Co. v. Saunders, 32 Fla. 434 (1893) ; Western Union v. Halton, 71 I1
App. 63 (1897); Western Union v. Ferguson, 157 Ind. 64 (1901); West v. Western
Union, 39 Kans. 93 (1888); Western Union v. Rogers, 68 Miss. 748 (1891); Curtin v.
Western Union, 13 App. Div. (N. Y.) 253 (1897); Morton v, Western Union, 53 Ohio
431 (1895); Thomas v. Western Union, 50 Pitts. L. J. (Pa.) 211 (1903); Lewis v.
Western Union, 46 W. Va. 48 (1899); Corcoran v. Postal Teleg. Co., 80 Wash. 570
(1914); Summerfield v. Western Union, 87 Wis. 1 (1894); Western Union v. Burris,
179 Fed. 92 (Ark. 1910). Compare Cook v. Grey, 70 Kans. 705 (1905), where recov-
ery was denied against a postmaster who negligently delayed delivery of a postal card
advising the addressee of his father's death. Texas, in at least one case has departed
from its current of authority and denied recovery. See Western Union v. Edmond-
son, 91 Tex. 206 (1889).
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which impose upon carriers the duty to use reasonable care to protect the
modesty and purity of female passengers. are with one exception, 34  in
accord in holding telegraph companies liable for mental distress caused by
negligent delay or inaccuracy in the transmission of messagcs.
Apart from the fact that only a minority of states impose such liability,
it is noteworthy that even among that minority, various and divergent
"exceptions" and limitations are imposed upon the right to recover against
telegraph companies. Thus in some jurisdictions, a right of action has been
restricted to those in contractual privity with the telegraph company. 36
Other states3 6 have permitted senclees to recover, preferring to consider the
liability as tortious rather than contractual. In Texas the cases reveal an
inner conflict on this point.
37
Another limitation imposed by some of the minority prevents the im-
position of liability unless it was apparent from the message itself that a
relationship subsisted between the plaintiff and the deceased or sick person
concerning whom the message was sent. . 8  In other cases, the telegraph
company has been held to be "charged with the notice of the relationship
between the parties named whether disclosed by the terms of the message
or not".21 So too, a distinction has been made between "close relatives" and
"more distant relatives such as brother-in-law or friends" requiring the court
to "presume" that mental anguish resulted from the company's negligence,
in cases of "close relatives" whereas proof of the fact of mental anguish
must be adduced where the plaintiff is a "more distant relative". 40  A
further distinction is made in some but not all Texas courts between cases
where a delayed message was one intended to relieve the sendee of already
existing mental anxiety and cases where the defendant's negligence gives rise
to heretofore non-existing mental distress. The cases making this distinction
3 4Minnesota denied recovery in Francis v. Western Union, 58 Minn. 252, (1894),
although it had protected female modesty in Lucy v. Chicago etc. Ry., fupra note 12.
3 5
Gulf, C. and S. F. Co. v. Levy, 59 Tex. 563 (1883). Recovery has often
been denied even where contractual privity between plaintiff and the tetegraph corn-
pany has been established. See West v. Western Union, and Corcoran v. Postal Teleg.
Co., supra note 33.
38See Relle v. Western Union, 53 Tex. 308 (1881); Wadsworth v. Western Union,
86 Tenn. 695 (1888); Young v. Western Union, 107 -N. C. -370 (1891); Chapman
v. Western Union, 90 Ky. 265 (1890) ; Mentzer v. Western Uunion, 93 Iowa 752
(1895) ; Graham v. Western Union, 109 La. 1069 (1903). Compare Gulf, C. and
S. F. Co. v. Levy, supra note 35, with Relle v. Western Union, suwpra note 26.
3 7
See Relle v. Western Union, "53 Tex. 308 (1881).
8
SWestern Union v. Luck, 91 Tex. 178 (1897) ; Western Union v. Moore, 76
Tex. 66 (1890); Western Union v. Brown, 71 Tex. 723 (1888).
89Western Union v. Coffin, 88 Tex. 94. Note that this case -is -intermediate among
those cited conlra in note 38.
4
0Cashion v. Western Union, 123 N.. C. 267 (1898); Western Union v. Coffin,
.rup94 note 39.
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allow recovery only in the latter situation.41 Why the interest in freedom
from continuing anxiety for one believed to be dangerously ill should be
deemed less important and less deserving of protection than the interest in
being promptly apprised of a relative's unexpected death is a question that
may well puzzle even a casuist. The result of these limitations and distinc-
tions is obviously to make ambiguous the ambit of liability of the telegraph
companies.
DUTY OF TELEPHONE COMPANIES TO PREVENT MENTAL DISTRESS RESULTING
FROM FAILURE TO RENDER REASONABLY EFFICIENT SERVICE
Very similar to the cases of delayed telegrams asking for medical aid,
4' 2
are those asking for recovery against telephone companies for alleged mental
distress resulting from negligent failure of the company's employees to re-
spond to calls, or having responded, from failure promptly to attempt to
put the plaintiff in contact with a doctor whom he sought to reach for
medical aid. Such cases against telephone companies are few. The curious
fact, however, is that of the five cases43 which the writer has been able to
find involving such suits, only one"4 allowed recovery although each of
the five except one, were decided by courts that have allowed recovery in
the telegraph cases. In Lawson v. Haskell Telephone Company,45 recovery
was denied because the plaintiff, who had used his father's telephone in
the attempt to reach a doctor, had tio contract with the defendant telephone
company. The inference that an action might have been maintained had
there been contractual privity, seems, however, to have been dispelled by an
earlier holding in the same jurisdiction. 46  In Cumberland Telephone Company
v. Jackson.47 the court in denying recovery, stressed the fact that the de-
fendant's misconduct had not been wilful, intimating that wilful failure
to put through plaintiff's call might subject the telephone company for any
resulting mental distress. In the only case allowing recovery, 48 it appeared
41Akard v. Western Union, 44 S. W. 538 (Tex. C. A. 1897); Rowell v. Western
Union, 75 Tex. 26 (1889). But apparently contra, see Womack v. Western Union, 225
S. W. 417 (Tex. 1893).
42See supra note 30.
4
3Lawson v. Haskell Telephone Co., 224 S. W. 390 (Tex. C. A. 1920); South
Western Telephone Co. v. Solomon, 54 Tex. C. A. 306 (1909); Cumberland Tele-
phone Co. v. Sutton, 156 Ky. 191 (1913); Cumberland Telephone Co. v. Jackson
95 Miss. 79 (1909); South Western Telephone Co. v. Harris, 214 S. W. 845 (Tex.
C. A. 1919).
4 4 South Western Telephone Co. v. Harris,. upra note 43.
45Supra note 43
46
South Western Telephone Co. v. Solomon, supra note 43.
4"Supra note 43.
8$up, a aote 44.
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that the defendant negligently failed to put through plaintiff's call for help
although plaintiff had informed the telephone operator of the nature and
importance of the call.
Here again, it is difficult to perceive any reasonable basis for distinguish-
ing between negligent delay in delivering a telegram asking for medical aid
and a negligent failure to put through promptly a telephone call for the
same purpose. Yet if the few cases on point are to be taken as criteria,
the courts are not disposed to allow recovery in telephone cases as freely
as in the telegraph cases.
DUTY OF INNKEEPERS TO PROTECT GUESTS FROM EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Theoretically, the relationship of innkeeper and guest might involve the
same duties in respect to the interest in freedom from emotional disturbance
as that of carrier and passenger. A duty might be imposed on innkeepers
protecting guests from mental distress inflicted by the innkeeper or his servants.
The further duty might exist requiring the innkeeper to exercise reasonable
care to protect guests from mental distress inflicted by fellow-guests.
There appear to be no cases considering the extent, if any, of an inn-
keeper's duty to protect guests from emotional disturbances caused by fellow-
guests. There are on the other hand, cases in at least eight jurisdictions
4 9
which have allowed recovery against an innkeeper for mental distress in-
flicted upon a guest by an innkeeper or his servants. In most of these
cases,5 0 alleged humiliation was inflicted upon guests by charges of im-
morality, when in fact the plaintiffs were husband and wife, or otherwise
so related as to render their association, in mutual quarters at the hotel,
above reproach. It must be noted, however that in all these cases, in
addition to making open charges of immorality the innkeeper or his servants
had made a forceful entry into the rooms of the plaintiffs and, in some
cases,5 1 had caused arrests. The fact of wrongful entry or arrest may well
justify consideration of the damages allowed for mental distress as being
merely parasitic in character, rather than constituting an independent basis
for recovery. Indeed, in one New York decision,62  recovery was denied
4 9Kalb and Sullivan v. Win. Penn Hotel Co., 86 Pa. Super. Ct. 359 (1926);
Warren v. Penn Harris Hotel Co., 29 Dauphin 163 (Pa. 1926); Frewen v. Page,
238 Mass. 499 (1921); Emmke v. De Silva, 293 Fed. 17 (Mo. 1923); Boyce v,
Greely Square Hotel Co., 169 N. Y. S. 191 (1917); Newcomb Hotel v. Corbett,
108 S. E. 309 (Ga. 1921); Florence Hotel Co. v. Bumpas, 194 Ala. 69 (1915);
Moody v. Kenny, 153 La. 1007 (1923); McCarthy v. Niskern, 22 Minn. 90 (1875);
De Wolf v. Ford, 193 N. Y. 397 (1908); Dalzell v. Dean Hotel Co.. 193 Mo. App. 383 (1916).
5OFrewen v. Page; Emmke v. De Silva; Boyce v. Greely Square Hotel Co.;
Newcomb Hotel v. Corbett. De Wolf v. Ford; Moody v. Kenny, supra note 49.
51See Moody v. Kenny, rapra note 49.
*2Hurd v. Hotel Astor Co.. 169 N. Y. S. 359 (1918).
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where it appeared that the accusations of immorality were made in a hall-
way of the hotel and that there had been no forceful entry into the guests'
room. The court said:
"There is a marked difference between the conduct of the inn-
keeper complained of here and that complained of in the DeWolfe
and Boyce cases cited. Here there was no intrusion in the
privacy of plaintiff's room. The conversation took place in the
hall."
At least three cases53 have allowed recovery against an innkeeper who
in the course of wrongfully depriving the guest of his room or ejecting
him therefrom, used abusive and insulting language as where plaintiff was
wrongfully accused of having tried to evade payment. It is apparent that
in these cases too, there was an independent cause of action apart from
mental distress, to which the latter might be considered parasitic. Curiously
enough, Texas, which is usually liberal in allowing recovery for mere mental
anguish, denied recovery5 4 against an innkeeper in a case where on demurrer,
it appeared that the innkeeper "intending to humiliate plaintiff and to injure
his reputation and standing" wrongfully caused plaintiff to be locked out
of his room, in the presence of others. The court in spite of the fact that
an independent cause of action existed because of the wrongful deprivation
of the room, held that "mental anguish resulting from humiliation cannot
be . . (an) element of actual damage".
On the basis of these cases therefore, it cannot he said that any court
has imposed liability upon an innkeeper for mental distress even intention-
ally inflicted by the innkeeper or its servants. In all cases allowing recovery,
there has been an independent cause of action, apart from mental anguish.
It seems wholly unlikely, therefore, that a duty will be imposed on innkeepers
to protect even its female guests from mental anguish caused by fellow-guests.
DUTY OF OPERATORS OF THEATRES AND AMUSEMENT RESORTS
TO PROTECT PATRONS FROM MENTAL ANGUISH
As in the cases of carriers and innkeepers, operators of theatres and
amusement resorts might theoretically be under the two-fold duty of protect-
ing patrons from mental distress inflicted by their own or their servants'
conduct as well as by that of other patrons. Here, too, however, what little
authority there is to be found is restricted to cases where the mental distress
58Dalzell v. Dean Hotel Co.; Florenc Hotel Co. v. B-opa; McCarthy Y. Niskern,
mpma note 49.
64MAsin and Browder v4 McCutdchaoo 33 Tea. C . 387 (1905).
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is charged to the operator's or his servants' misconduct and not to that of
fellow-patrons.
Several casesH6 appear to have allowed recovery for humiliation suffered
by a patron when he was ordered off the premises or ejected. Again it
is evident that an eviction and, generally, a breach of contract existed and
served as an independent basis of recovery apart from mental distress. In
two cases," recovery was denied for humiliation suffered when admission was
refused to a ticket holder, and this despite defendant's breach of contract. In
short, in these cases, too, no definite authority is afforded which indicates
that recovery is allowed for mere mental anguish apart from other elements of
recovery.
LIABILITY FOR MENTAL DISTRESS RESULTING FROM MUTILATION
OF THE CORPSE OF A RELATIVE
A considerable number of cases can be found appearing to allow recovery
for mental anguish resulting from the mutilation of the corpse of a relative of
the plaintiff, and this whether the mutilation was intentional57 or merely
negligent.5" In a few states, a distinction seems to be made between intentional
and negligent mutilation, recovery being restricted to the former. 6 9
Despite the dogma which may be found repeated by the early writers and
in the earlier cases denying the existence of "rights of property in a dead
body", 60 the results of the cases indicate that, for some purposes, at least, a
SsWeber.Stair Co, v. Fisher, 119 S. W. 195 (Ky. 1909) ; Aaron v. Ward,
203 N. Y. 351 (1911); Smith v. Leo, 92 Hun. (N. Y.) 242 (1895). And
see Davis v. Tocoma Ry., 35 Wash. 203 (1904). Here there was an intimation of an
offensive touching.
5 6Marrone v. Washington Jockey Club, 35 App. D. C. 82 (1910); Luxem-
berg v. Keith and Proctor Amusement Co., 117 N. Y. S. 979 (1909).
S7Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281 (1868); Burney v. Children's Hospital,
169 Mass. 257 (1897); Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307 (1891); Darey v. Presbyterian
Hospital, 202 N. Y. 259 (1911); Jacobus v. Congregation of Children of Israel, 107 Ga.
518 (1899); Wright v. Beardsley, 46 Wash. 16 (1907); but this case was overruled
by Kans. v. Cremation Society of Washington. 103 Wash. 521; See also Keyes v.
Konkel. 119 Mich. 550 (1899). Most cases in which intentional misconduct is charged
involve unauthorized 'autopsies. See intimation in Southern Life Insurance Co. v. Mor-
gan, 21 Ala. App. 5 (1925), that recovery would be denied even where intentional
misconduct was charged.
S8Reinhan v. Wright, 125 Ind. 536 (1890). Contra, Nail v. McCullough, 88
Okla. 243 (1923); Hall v. Jackson, 24 Colo. App. 225 (1913); Long v.
Chicago etc. Ry., 15 Okla. 5-12 (1905). In this latter case, the court renounces the
doctrine of Foley v. Phelps, 1 App. Div. (N. Y.) 551 (1896) which follows Larson
v. Chase (supra note 57) in cases of intentional misconduct.
"9ee Hockenhammer v. Lexington and Eastern Ry., 24 Ky. L. R. 2383 (1903);
Gadbury v. Bleitz, 133 Wash. 134 (1925). But compare the latter with Kanta y.
Cremation Society of Washington, *supra note 57.
602 BL Com. 4i9; Eai P.. C:652; R it.v. 'Shaipe Deorsly a B. 160 (1857).
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corpse has been recognized as the "subject of property". It is true that English
courts have refused to recognize a testamentary bequest of the body of the
testator as giving a property right to direct the disposal ot the corpse to
the legatee as against the members of the testator's family. 61 On the other
hand, actions have been sustained for disturbances of burial places of relatives
62
and indictments have been upheld for grave robberies.6 3 So, too, the courts have
adjudicated disputes on the question as to which of a decedent's relatives has
the primary right to dispose of the body.64 Decrees have been granted in
equity restraining the destruction of cemeteries and bodies therein.6 5 These
cases suggest a tendency to regard the corpse, for those purposes, at least, as
the subject of property. Indeed in many cases, the courts speak of the interest
in a corpse as "quasi-property".
6 6
The cases allowing recovery for the mutilation of a corpse may thus be
explained on the theory that a right of action has been established apart from
mental distress to which the latter is parasitic. It is noteworthy in this con-
nection, that in no case has the right of a wife to direct the burial of her
husband been held to depend upon the degree of her affection or upon the
extent of her sorrow. There is authority, moreover, which denies recovery for
mental anguish resulting from what appears to be carelessness in the handling
of a corpse, where in fact, the body had not been mutilated or lost.6 7 In a
word, what right there is to recover for mental anguish resulting from the
mutilation of a relative's corpse, seems not to be allowed solely because of the
distress, but is dependent upon the physical violation of the corpse.
GiWilliams v. Williams, L.R. 20 Chan. Div. 659 (1882).
6 2jacobus v Congregation of Children of Israel, 107 Ga. 518 (1899).
6SRex v. Sharpe, supra note 60.
64Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 207 Pa. 313 (1904); Hackett v. Hackett, 18 R. I. 155
(1893); Weld v. Walker, 130 Mass. 422 (1881); Hadsell v. Hadsell & Ohio C. C.
196 (1900); Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R. 1. 227 (1872). See also
Bogert v. City of Indianapolis, 13 Ind. 134, 138.
6 5Trustees of 1st. Evangelical Church v. Walsh, 57 Ill. 363 (1870); In re
Brick Presbyterian Church, 4 Bradf. (N. Y.) 503 (1857).
G6sHackett v. Hackett, supra note 64; Griffith v. Charlotte C. and A. Ry., 23
S.C. 25 (1884); Anonymous Ohio case, reported in 4 Amer. L. Times 127.
6 7Thus in Stahl v. Necker, 171 N. Y. S. 728, defendant returned ashes to plain-
tiff purporting to be those of her husband, whose body defendant had cremated. The urn
indicated April 31 as the date of cremation. On that date, deceased had been alive. Plain-
tiff sued for mental anguish resulting from the belief that the identity of her
husband's ashes had been lost. Defendant assured her and the jury found that
these were the ashes and that the mistake had been only clerical. Upon that finding,
the court reversed a judgment for plaintiff, saying that if the body had actually been
mutilated or the ashes really lost, plaintiff might have recovered for mental suffer-
ing, but that therm could be no recovery in the absence of actual mistreatment of
the rmains by defendant.
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9 CONCLUSION
The interest in freedom from mere emotional distress has been accorded
a very limited recognition by the courts. Most cases which appear to extend
legal protection thereto, in fact reveal independent causes of action and are
,merely applications of the rule that if a right of action is established apart from
mental distress, the latter may be taken into consideration in assessing the
damages. The cases imposing liability for mere mental distress are principally
the cases against carriers and telegraph companies. Even within this limited
sphere, the courts allowing recovery have been uncertain of their ground, and
the cases reveal inner conflicts, anomalies and diversities of view within the
same jurisdiction, which defy rationalization and which are persuasive against
increased recognition of the interest in freedom from mental distress.
. The fundamental objection to recovery in these cases centers, of course,
around the administrative difficulty of detecting false claims of emotional
disturbances. If courts are to recognize this interest as deserving of protection,
Land if administrative problems of proof are to be ignored in suits against car-
riers and telegraph companies, it is submitted that similar protection should
be accorded to this interest in other cases against any form of mental distress
which is recognizable as equally serious as that in the carrier and telegraph
cases. There appears to be no justification for confining such protection to such
exceptional forms of distress as result through offenses to female modesty
-or through delay in transmission of death messages. Obvious it is at any rate,
that if the protection of this interest is to find increased favor in the future,
the boundaries of protection must be realigned on the basis of sounder
social and economic considerations than those which now appear determin.
ative.
Carlisle, Pa. D. J. Farage
